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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16420

JOAN MARIE GORLICK,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The state charged appellant with obtaining or
exercising unauthorized control of another's ring, with a
value exceeding $1,000, in violation of Utah
§

~ode

Ann.

76-6-44.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The state tried appellant before a jury on January

8 and 9, 1979,

~ith

The Honorable,David B. Dee presiding.

On January 9, 1979, the jury found appellant guilty of theft,
a second-degree felony

(R. 298).

On March 23, 1979, Judge

Dee sentenced appellant to imprisonment at the Utah State
Prison for a term of one to fifteen years.

Judge Dee
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stayed execution of the term of imprisonment, contingent
upon appellant successfully completing a two-year probationa:
period, obtaining gainful employment during that period,
and paying a $1,000 fine

(R.

305-06).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict and
judgment of the district court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the afternoon of July 31, 1978, the victim,
David Delgado, was sitting in the lounge at the Room at
Top in the

Hilto~

Hotel

(R.

84).

During that same afternoo:

appellant, Joan Marie Gorlick, accompanied by Paul Tolman
and Calvin Smith, entered the lounge and sat at another
table

(R.

84-85).

Mr. Delgado subsequently joined

and her companions at their table

(R.

85).

appellar.~

They stayed at

the Hilton until about 10:30 p.m., each consuming several
drinks

(R.

86).
Duirng the course of the evening, Mr. Delgado anc

appellant negotiated over the purchase of appellant's gold
necklace and Mr. Delgado's

diamon~

ring

(R.

87, 98-104).

Appellant and Mr. Delgado could not agree on the value of
the latter's ring.
(R.

100).

In fact,

Their estimates ranged :rom 53'10 to S70C
~r.

Milton PetersGn,

a diamond salesmar

and appraiser affiliated with a local diamond emporium,
estimated the value of the rinc as Sl,250 to $1,400

on
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August 1, 1978, the day of the theft (R. 127-29).
Appellant wished to have the ring appraised.

Mr.

Delgado gave her possession of the ring to appraise while
they were sitting at the table; he refused to let her take
the ring home for appraisal

(R. 104).

About 10:30 p.m., Hr. Delgado wished to leave
the Hilton and go to the Sun Tavern, which was located
several blocks away.

Appellant and her companions agreed

to drive him there (R. 86).

Mr. Delgado took possession of

his ring from appellant (R. 114).
consumed several more drinks

At the Sun Tavern, each

(R. 87).

The negotiations over the jewelry continued at the
Sun Tavern.

Miss Jacquelyn JoKunst,

a cocktail waitress

at the Sun Tavern,observed r·'lr. Delgado displaying his
diamond ring, while on his finger, to the appellant
(R.

136,

137-38).
h~ile

Mr. Delgado was handing the ring across

the table to appellant, he dropped it into a glass on the
table

(R. 114-15).

Ao?ellant then drank the contents of the

glass and allegedly swallowed the ring (R. 88, 115-16).
Appellant refused to return the
s~al~owed

it (Id.).

~

r~ng,

claiming she had

Mr. Delgado then called over Miss Kunst

and told her that appellant had swallowed his ring and had
refused to return it

(R. 88).

\\Then Miss Kunst asked appellant

:: she had swallowed the ring, appellant, keeping her lips
;::.rsed, nodded

a~firmatively

(R. 132).
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Mr. Delgado left the table, called the Salt Lake
City Police Department, and wrote down the make and model
and license plate number of appellant's automobile (R. 89).
Mr. Delgado informed appellant that he had notified the
police (Id.).

She and her companions left and Mr. Delgado

awaited the arrival of the police (Id.).
Salt Lake City Police Officer George Kearns arrive:
at the Sun Tavern in response to Mr. Delgado's complaint
(R.

145).

Subsequently, he located appellant and Mr.

Smith sitting in her Lincoln Continental,

w~~ch

Calvi~

was parked

in front of the Hilton Hotel, and which matched the descript:
given to h1.rr, ny Mr. Delgado (R. 146-47, 149).
Kearns asked appellant for some identification.

Officer
Her vehicle

and her driver's license indicated that she was the person
whom Mr. Delgado had complained had stolen his ring (R. 14/J
Officer Kearns advised appellant of her

~iranda

rights and

then proceeded to interview her about Mr. Delgado's

complai~:

(R. 147-48).
At first, appellant denied being at the Sun
that evening and knowing of Mr.
240-43).

D~lgado

Mr. Smith also denied

Taver~

(R. 148, 228, 236,

kno~ing

Mr. Delgado or

being at the Sun Tavern that evening (R. 254).

of:icer

Kearns then arrested appellant and placed her in the front
seat of a police vehicle

(R. 149).

She then informed Of:'ice

Kearns that she wished to talk about the incident.

She
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admitted being at the Sun Tavern with Mr. Delgado (R. 149).
She then falsely told the officer that she had purchased
the ring from Mr. Delgado for $300, and that it was in her
purse

(R.

150, 236-38).

Officer Pat Smith, who had arrived

to assist Officer Kearns, also interviewed the appellant.
Appellant recited a third version about what occurred at
the Sun Tavern.

She told Officer Smith that she had

pretended that she had swallowed the ring and that it was
1n her purse on the seat of her vehicle
Officer
Kearns

s~ith

(R.

(R. 264, 265, 266).

retrieved the purse and gave it to Officer

264).
Officer Kearns had also arrested Mr. Calvin

Smith in connection with the theft of a second ring, which
Mr.

Delgado had falsely reported to the officer as belonging

to him

IR.

152, 166).

Subsequently, Mr. Delgado notified

Detective Gillies that the second ring belonged to Mr.
Smith
the

IR.

161).

co~plaint

On August 31, 1978, the court dismissed

against Mr. Smith

(R.

3).

On October 19, 1978, Judge Uno ordered appellant
bound over to the district court ;or arraignment (R.

3).

She was found guilty of second-degree theft by
a jury or. January 9, 1979

(R. 298).

She appeals the verdict

and sentence of the district court.
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APGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO SnClh' THAT
THE JURY'S UNANI!10US VERDICT It\
FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY OF THEFT
IS UNSC:PPOPTED BY SUBSTANT:.:-.::..,
EVIDE!KE h'EICH COULD COl\'YINCE
REASONAB:::..E HINDS THAT SHE IS
GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant contends that her conviction is
unsupported by sufficient evidence.

Her contention is :ounc;

upon the allegations that the victim's testimony is unworthy
of belief, that his testimony is uncorroborated, and that
her multiple witnesses

prc~e

her innocence (Br. 9, 10, 12).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, State v. _cones, 554 P.2d 1321 (Utah, 1976), none
of these

co~tentions

have merit.

In State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216
the

defenda~t

(Utah, 1976),

appealed his conviction for burglary and

theft, claiming there was insufficient evidence to uphold
his conivction.

He based his claim upon the fact that

the witnesses could not identify all the co-defendants and
gave conflicting testimony about the circumstances of the
crime.

This Court rejected his appeal and held:
This court has lon~ upheld
the standard that on an appeal from
conviction the court cannot weigh
the evidence nor say ;..•hat quantum is
necessary to establish a fact beyond
a reasonable doubt so long as the
evidence given is substantial.
Further,
this court has maintained that its
function is not to determine suilt or
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innocence, the weight to give
conflicting evidence, the credibility
of witnesses, or the weight to be given
defendant's testimony.
Id. at 218

(citations omitted).

This Court continued:
This court has set the standard
for determining sufficiency of
evidence to require that it be so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds could
not reasonably believe defendant
committed a crime.
Unless there is
a clear showing of lack of evidence,
the jury verdict will be upheld.
Id. at 219

(citations omitted).

Accord; State v. Mills,

530 P.2d 1272 (\Jtah, 1975).
As this Court outlined in State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110,
307 P. 2d 212

(1957), cert. den. 355 U.S. 848 (1957):

But it is not sufficient
merely that reasonable minds may have
entertained such doubt (reasonable doubt).
Before a verdict may be properly set aside,
it must appear that the evidence was
so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that
reasonable minds acting fairly upon it
must have entertained reasonable doubt
that defendants co~itted the crime.
Unless the evidence compels the conclusion as a matter of law, the verdict
~ust

307 P. 2d at 215

~

stand.

(emphasis

in orioinal).

The victim, Mr. Delgado, testified that he did
not give appellant permission to take the ring with her
(R.

104).

He testified that apl)ellant allegedly swallowed his

rinc; and refused to return it

(R.

87, 89).

.l\lthough appellant
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and her companions gave testimony contrary to Mr. Delgado's,
"the weight and credibility of the testimony of the victim
was a matter for the jury."
883 (Utah, 1978).

See also:

State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880,
State v. Mills,

~·

at 1273.

Appellant's contention that Mr. Delgado's testimony
was unworthy of belief because it is uncorroborated is
frivolous.

First, the fact that the victim's testimony

is uncorroborated and

con:licti~~

in some respects does not

render such testimony insubstantial.

Second, Mr. Delgado's

57 9 P. 2d 9 0 8, 911 (Utah, 19 7 8) .
testimony

is corroborated by other

admissions.

Miss Kunst, the

State v. Middlestadt,

~itnesses

~~itress

and appellant'!

at the Sun Tavern,

asked appellant if she had swallowed the ring.

Appellant,

keeping her mouth clenched, nodded affirmatively in response
(R. 132).

After her arrest, appellant admitted to Officer

Smith that she had pretended that she had swallowed the
ring and that it was in her purse (R. 265).
Appellant's contention that her "multiple ••itnesse:
(Br. 12), she and her companions,
case is also meritless.

undercut the prosecution':

The numbe;: o: witnesses for or

against a particular proposition is irrelevant.

:•loreover,

appellant's testimony is subject to serious doubt.
was arrested, she lied to the arresting o:ficer.

~hen

she

She statec

that she did not know Mr. Delgado and that she hac not been
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to the Sun Tavern that evening

(R. 149, 157, 160).

She

subsequently changed her story and told the officer she had
purchased the ring for $300

(R. 141, 255).

In open court,

she admitted that she had lied to the arresting officer
(R.

129,

236-243).

After she was

placed in a police vehicle,

she recited a third story that she had pretended to swallow
the ring

(R.

265).

Her companion, Calvin Smith, who was

simultaneously arrested with her, similarly denied his
presence at the Sun Tavern that evening and the circumstances
surrounding the ring

(R. 256).

The jury is justified in discounting her evidence
and accepting the prosecution's.

As this Court stated in

State v. Schoenfield, 545 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah, 1976):
In regard to defendant's contention
that the evidence is not sufficient
to justify his conviction, these observations are pertinent:
the jury
were not obligated to accept as true
defendant's own version of the evidence
nor his self-exculpating statements
as to his intentions and his conduct.
Thev were entitled to use their own
judgment as to what evidence thev would
believe and to draw any reasonable
in!erences therefrom.
I~

the instant case, appellant has failed to carry her burden

in showing that the evidence is so insubstantial that
reasonable rninds could not believe her guilty beyond a
reasonatle doubt.
l·:ilson,

State v. Daniels, supra, at 883; State v.

565 P.2d 66,

68

(l'tah, 1977).

The jury experienced
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little difficulty in finding appellant guilty because it
returned a unanimous verdict within several hours after
beginning its deliberations

(R.

298-300).

Appellant has

failed to demonstrate that reasonable minds must have
entertained reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt.

State

v. Sullivan, supra.
POI"JT II.
APPELLAN':'' S Cot<DUCT PRESENTED THE
JURY WITH SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
FROM l'ffiiC!'l IT COULD INFER THAT
SHE OBTAINED THE VICTIM'S RING
l·iiTH THE PURPOSE TO DEPRIVE HIM
~HEREOF.

Appellant's

con~ention

that the state failed to

prove her crimlnal intent in taking the victim's ring is
meritless.

As this Court warned in State v. Canfield, 18

Utah 2d 292,

422 P.2d 196 (1967):

Defendant's case is presented in
the all-too-common manner of defense
counsel:
arguing from his own theory
of the evidence that it does not show
the necessary intent to justify the
verdict.
But this is at variance with
the correct pattern of procedure on
appeal and paints quite a different
picture of this case than we are obliged to see.
It is out duty to
respect the prerogative of the Jury
as the exclusive judses of the
credibility of the witnesses and as
the determiners of the facts.
Consequently, we assume that they believed
the state's evidence, and we sur ·ey it,
together with all fair inferenCE' that
the jury could reasonablv draw thercfro~.
in the light most favorable to their
verdict.
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Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the
light most favorable to the verdict, including any reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, State v. Helm. 563 P.2d 794
(Utah, 1977); State v. Canfield, supra, clearly the record

contai~s

substantial evidence from which the jury could infer
aopellant took the ring with the requisite criminal intent.
Appellant's conduct provides the clue to her intent.

In

State v. Hookins, 11 Utah 2d 486, 359 P.2d 486, this Court rejected
the defendant's contention that the prosecution had not
proven his intent to burglarize an apartment.

The Court

held:
It is to be remembered that intent,
being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible
of direct proof.
But it can be inferred
from conduct and attendant circumstances
in the light of human experience .
359 P.2d at 487.

Accord:

State v. Romero, supra at 218

("The intent to steal or unlav.'fully deprive the rightful
owners of their property can be inferred by defendant's
conduct and the attendant circumstances testified to by
the

Y:it~esses,");

State"~·

['·'] e are av.·are of

Canfield,

supra at 198

(".

no better nor f>ersuasive way to do it

!prove what a man intended)
and 1'hat he said .

than by showing

both what he did

. ").

The jury convicted appellant upon an information
with theft, in violation of Utah Code Ann.

charinc

her

/C-E-~'•<\

11953),

in that she "did obtain or exercise
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unauthorized control over the property of David Delgado
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof

(R.

l3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1953), defines the critical
terms:

* * *
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to
property, to bring about a transfer
of possession or of some other legally
recognized interest in property, whether
to the obtainor or another .
(3)
"Purpc=-= ~o deprive" means
to have the coLs-~c~s objective:
(a) To withhold property
permanently or for so extended
a period or to use under such
circumstances that a substantial
~ortion of its economic value, or
~f the use and benefit thereof,
would be los~.
(c) To dispose of the
property under circumstances
that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized
control" means, but is not necessarily
limited to, conduct heretofore defined
or known as common-law larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion,
larceny by bailee, and embezzlement.

* * *
The present theft statutes consolidate the common
law crimes against property into a single offense--theft.
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-403 (1953).

This s-cz:tute further

provides:
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. An accusation of theft may
be supported by evidence that it was
committed in any manner specified in
sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410 .
Under this section, any evidence establishing one of the
comprised offenses supports a guilty verdict.
Tavlor,

570 P.2d 697

State v.

(Utah, 1977).

The jury could reasonably believed that appellant's
conduct demonstrated her intent to bring about a transfer
of possession of the ring with the purpose to withhold it
permanently or to dispose of it under circumstances that make
it unlikely that Mr. Delgado could recover it.

Mr. Delgado

only gave her possession of the ring to appraise at the
table

(R.

90, 104).

She "pretended" that she swallowed the

ring and refused to return it to the victim (R. 87, 106,
115-16, 132}, and then left the victim at the Sun Tavern
after he ir.formed her that he had called the police (R. 106).
\\hen the police subsequently confronted her at the Hilton,
she at first told them she did not know Mr. Delgado and
i(:nev; nothing about any ring (R. 148, 157, 160).

Then she

said she knew Mr. Delgado, but had purchased the ring for
'>

$300

IF.

~lth Mr.
~ith

149, 255).

Her companion also denied acquaintance

Delgado, being at the Sun Tavern, and familiarity

the ring

(F.

256).

After the police arrested her,

she finally told the truth that she had pretended that she had
sv;alloY-·ed the ring

(R.

265).

She admitted these stories
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during trial

(R. 229, 236, 240-43).

There was no close
They had

relationship between appellant and Mr. Delgado.
met only briefly several times over the course of
six months (R. 93-94, 216-19).

approxima~;

The victim was uneasy about

letting her keep the ring on the table, let alone letting
her keep it over night (R. 113-14).

The victim mistrusted

the appellant because of prior dealings regarding a job
she had offered him (R. 96)
The jury could properly convict her whether she
formed the intent before she took possession of the ring
or after,

=F

'~se

to "obtain or exercise unauthorized contr:.

comprehends common law larceny, embezzlement and the other
offenses against property.

(1953).

This Court

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(4)

re~ognized

1019' 1021 (1978)'

in State v. Bender, 581 P.2c

[W] hen one has the intent to stea:

the theft is completed at the time of asportation .
The jury received substantial evidence to infer that

appel:~

had the intent to steal at the time she took the ring with
her when she left the Sun Tavern.

1·1hen appellant left the

Sun Tavern with the ring, the victim was left only with the
mere possibility that he might recover from a casual

.

acquaintance his valuable ring, a readily disposable item.
Cf:

State v. Bender,

~at

883

(".

. e\·en i.f defenda;.:

story that he only wanted the ve<icle for transportation to
California were to be believed, it

~ould

have

=

en only a
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possibility that Midvalley Auto would have recovered its
stolen automobile in California").
POINT III.
MARKET VALUE IS THE PROPER TEST
FOR VALUING STOLEN PROPERTY IN ORDER
TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE OF THE THEFT;
AND THE JURY WAS GIVEN SUBSTANTIAL
AND UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THAT
THE VALUE OF THE RING EXCEEDED $1,000
AT THE TIME AND PLACE WHERE THE THEFT
OCCURRED.
In State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah, 1977),
this Court set forth the standard for valuing property in
the:t cases.

In Logan, the defendant contended that

replacement cost, not market value, was the proper test.
This Court rejected his contentions and approved the trial
court's instruction of value:
. . . That value is the highest
price, estimated in terms of money,
for which the property would have sold
in the open market at the time and in
that locality if the owner was desirous
o: selling, but under no urgent necessity
of doing so, and if the buyer was
desirous of buying but under no urgent
necessity of so doing, and if seller
had a reasonable time within which to
find a purchaser, and the buyer had
knowledge of the character of the
property and of the uses to which it
might be put.

"

Id. at 812-813.

By this de:inition, the values discussed between the victim
and the a~pellant are immaterial, for it is not the value of
the item to a particular person, but the value commanded in
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the open market.

People v. Tillman, 59 Mich. App. 768,

229 N.W.2d 922 (1975); State v. Armstrong, 361 S.W. 2d 811
(Mo. 1962); People v.
P.2d 953

Lizar~aga,

122 Cal.App.2d 436, 264

(1954); Jewell v. State, 216 r1d. 110, 139 A.2d 707

(1958).
In the instant case, the prosecution produced Mr.
Milton Petersen, a local diamond salesman and appraiser,
qualified to give his expert ooinion about the value of
diamonds

(R. 124-25).

He \·alued the ring on the day of the

theft between $1,250 and $1,400 for a willing buyer and
seller, without either operating under any duress

will~

(R. 127-25

He also ga''"' the Keystone value of the ring as being $500
to $600.

This value only attaches in situations where the

buyer has very great buying power (R.
in need of "quick cash,"

(R. 129).

128), or the seller is

However, this Keystone

value is not the proper standard for valuation, since it doe;
not reflect the price between a willing buyer and a willing
seller where neither is negotiating under duress, as require:
under Logan,

~-

The jury properly inferred that Mr. Petersen's
testimony related to the value of the ring in Salt Lake Cour·
The call of the question related to the date of the offense
(R. 127).

Mr. Petersen was called as an expert familiar

with the local market (R. 125).

He referred to the price

increases in the local diamond trade, based on the
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fluctuations in the international money market (R. 127-28).
The court's instructions directed the jury to find that
the theft of the ring occurred in Salt Lake County (R. 32),
and that its value on the date of the theft and at the
situs of the theft occurred in Salt Lake County (R. 40).
The appellant presented no evidence of a lower market value.
"It is sufficient if the fair market value is established
by expert testimony."
at 954.

People v. Lizarraga, supra, 264 P.2d

Therefore, the jury could only infer that the value

of the ring exceeded $1,000 on the date and at the place of
the theft.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has failed to show that the jury's
unanimous verdict is based on such insubstantial evidence
that reasonable minds could not believe her guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.
witnesses were

The weight and credibility of the

matters left solely to the jury as the

triers of fact.

The prosecution presented substantial

evidence from which the jury could infer that appellant took
the victim's ring

~ith

the intent to deprive him thereof.

The prosecution also presented expert testimony which
~

placed the fair market value of the ring on the date of
the offense as exceeding $1,000.

She has not established

the legal insufficiency of the jury's verdict; rather she
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has presented her theory of the case, which the jury
disbelieved.
Therefore, the verdict and sentence must be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
1--"ILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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